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Abstract
This paper considers cooperative game theoretic settings inwhich forming coalitions can
actas Stackelberg leaders. Wemodify they-value function byassuming that themembers
of a deviating coalitions can move "first" when choosing a coordinated strategy. We
accordingly define the ^-core and characterize the ^-coiq allocations of a cartel formation
game and ofa public good game.
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1 Introduction
The traditional representation of cooperative games with transferable utility is based on a
"characteristic" function, specifying for each coalition the amount of utility that its members
can ensure themselves in the underlying normal form game. This formulation is meant to
isolate coalitional decisions, abstracting from the strategic complexity of the cooperation
process. However, unless the payoffs of the members of a coalition and of its complement
are independent (orthogonal games) or opposite (constant slim games), the characteristic
function fails to be well defined^. Indeed, this is the case of many meaningful strategic
situations, in which the payoff of each player may generally depend on the strategies of all
players in the game. In such cases, the characteristic function can still be well defined by
introducing some assumptions on the strategies of players in the complementary coalitions
(the "outside players").
One way to deal with this problem, first proposed by von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944)
and considered by Aumann (1967), is to assume that outside players coordinate their strate
gies to minimize the aggregate payoff of the forming coalition. A temporal structure is
implicitly introduced in*the players' choice of strategies. In the so called a-core, the forming
coalition acts as a leader, and chooses its best strategies, given the minimizing behaviour of
outside players; in the /3-core, conversely, it behaves as a follower, and maximizes its payoff
given the coordinated strategies of outside players. Since in both cases deviations are very
costly, a and /?-core are usually very large. Moreover, still fulfilling a rationality require
ment in constant sum games, a and /9-assumptions do not seem justifiable in most economic
settings^.
An alternative approach proposed byAumann (1959) extends Nash Equilibrium "passive"
expectations to the cooperative framework. The concept of strong equilibrium defined by
the author assumes that deviating coalitions take as given the strategies of outside players.
Being immune from the deviations of any coalition, thus including the grand coalition and
every individual player, strong equilibria are both Nash equilibria and efficient strategies.
However, since in games with positive externalities the efficient strategies of excluded players
makecoalitional deviations "too" profitable, strong equilibriado not exist for many economic
problems.
In the contest ofsomerecenteconomic applications, a different approach has proved useful
^In Shubik (1982) terminology, the game is not a c-game.
^Indeed, in constant sum games, the Q-core coincides with the modified characteristic function proposed
by Harsanyi (1959), assigning to each coalition the solution of the variable threats Nash bargaining problem
with the respective complementary coalition.
in ensuring a non-empty core without making use of extreme assimiptions on the behaviour
of outside players such as the a and conjectures. This approach, named 7-approach by
Chander-Tulkens (1997), assumes that outside players neither jointly minimize the payoff
of a deviating coalition (as in the a and /3-core), nor keep their strategies fixed (as in the
Strong Nash Equilibrium), but they rather maximize their own utility as singletons. Here, the
behaviour of deviating players and which of outside players is implicitly assumed to develope
in two stages. In the first stage, similarly to the T game by Hart and Kurtz (1983),^ a
coalition forms and the excluded players split up as singletons; in the second stage, members
of the deviating coalition and excluded players simultaneously choose their strategies in the
underlying normal form game, given the specific coalition structure originated in the first
stage. Consequently, the strategy profile induced by the deviation of a coahtion S C N is
the Nash equilibrium among S and each individual player in N\S.
In this paper we modify the 7-assumption by removing this two stage structure and
reintroducing the temporal sequence in the choice of players' strategies in the underlying
normal form game, typical of the a and /3-core. We assume that the formation of a coalition
and the choice of a coordinated strategy by its members in the underlying game are two
simultaneous events, that can be thought of as a unique action. When a set of players
form a coalition, at the same time they choose a coordinated strategy, taking as given the
(non-cooperative) reaction of the excluded players as singletons. In this respect, deviating
coalitions possess a first mover advantage with respect to the outside players. We thus
associate with the deviation of every coalition S the Stackelberg equilibrium in which S acts
as leader and players in N\S play (individually) as followers.
According to this assumption, we define a modified version of the 7-core, denoted ^core.
We then show how some recent applications of the 7-core to oligopolistic markets and public
goods production problems are affected by our assumption. For the linear oligopoly case, we
prove that, although the 7-core is very large, the only allocation in the i^core is the equal
split allocation. For the linear-quadratic oligopoly, conversely, we show that, diff'erently from
the 7-core, the 0-core is empty. For the case of public goods production, we consider a simple
economy with one public and one private good, and we discuss the validity of Chander and
Tulkens' (1997) result of non-emptiness of the 7-core. We consider the case of symmetric
agents, and show that if preferences are linear in the pubhc good, then the allocation the
^The r game isindeed astrategic coalition formation game with fixed payoff division, inwhich thestrategies
consistof the choice of a coalition. Despite the different nature of the twogames, there is an analogyconcerning
the coalitionstructure induced by a deviation from the grand coalition. In the P game, any deviationfrom the
grand coalition's strategy profile induces a coalition structure in which the deviating coalition stay together
and the outside players split up.
authors propose belongs to the ^core. However, if preferences are strictly concave, the ^core
is shown to be empty for the specific case of quadratic utiUty and quadratic cost.
2 The general set-up
Let T = , be a strategic form game, where N is the (finite) players
set, Xi is the strategy set of player i, and Xs is the strategy set of a coalition of players
Let P{N) be the set of all possible partitions tt of the players set N] let Xir denote the set
n ^Ty for a^y tt € P{N). The set A" = U Xjr is the set of all possible outcomes (in
TeTT 7r6P(Ar)
terms of strategies) of the game T. The function Ui : X —* represents players' preferences.
We restrict our attention to transferable utility functions •u,.
Definition 1 A Nash Equilibrium of T is a strategy profile x such that, for all i € N,Xi € Xi
and, for all Xi € Xi, Ui (x) > Ui (rci,x_i).
2.1 The value function under the 7-assumption
The 7-assumption postulates that the worth of a coalition is the aggregate utility of its
members in the Nash equilibrium between that coalition (acting as a single player) and the
outside players (acting as singletons). The value function v~j{S) is defined for all S C N by:
where,
and, Vj € N\S,
= (1)
te5
X. =argmax Uj (xs, [xk]ke{N\S)\{i} -^ j) • (3)
Xj&Xj
Definition 2 The joint strategy x S Xj^ is in the 'y-core, if there exists no coalition S such
that Vy (S) > 13 (^)-
icS
'Note that, in general, Xs may not coincide with the set Xj.
i€S
2.2 The value function under the </>-assumption
The new value function we introduce is based on the assumption that deviating coalitions
exploit a first-mover advantage. As under the 7-assumption, when a coalition S forms,
players in N\S split up as singletons. Differently from the 7 case, the members of S choose
a coordinated strategy as leaders, thus anticipating the reaction of the players in N\S, who
simultaneously choose their best response as singletons. The strategy profile associated to the
deviation of a coalition S is the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game in which S is the leader
and the players in N\S are, individually, the followers. We denote this strategy profile as a
"partial equilibriumwith respect to S. Formally, this is the strategy profilex {S) = {xs, xj{xs))
such that
is =argmax (xs, {xj(xs)} ) (4)
and, Vj € N\S,
xj{xs) =argmax Uj (xs, {^k(xs)}kG(N\s)\{j}, ^j) • (5)
XjQXj
We first establish sufficient condition for the existence of x{S).
For every coalition S C N and strategy profile xs € Xs^ we define the restriction
r {N\S,xs) of the game T to the set of players N\S, given the fixed profile xs-
Proposition 1 Let T be a strategic form game. For every S C N and xs GXs, let the game
r {N\S,xs) possess a unique Nash Equilibrium. For every S C. N, let Xs be compact. Let
each player's payoff be continuous in every other player's strategy. Then, for every S C N,
there exists a partial equilibrium of T with respect to S. Moreover, if payoffs are strictly
concave in each players strategy, such a partial equilibrium is unique.
Proof. By condition (5), the strategy profile is the unique Nash equilibrium
of r {N\S, xs)- By the closedness of the Nashequilibrium correspondence (see, for instance,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pag.30), members of S maximize a continuous function over a
compact set (condition (4)); thus, by Weiestrass Theorem, a maximum exists. Uniqueness
comes as a straightforward consequence of the strict concavity of the leader's maximization
problem. •
We can thus define the value function V4,{S) as follows:
t65
Definition 3 The joint strategy x G is in the <f>-core, if there exists no coalition S such
that (S) > ^ Ui (x).
ies
In the next to sections we apply the concept of ^core to two widely studied economic
problems: cartel formation in oligopolies and resource allocation in economies with pubHc
goods.
I
3 Cartel formation in oligopoly
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in the application of cooperative solution
concepts to the problem of cartel formation under oligopoly [see, for a survey, Bloch (1997)].
A specific use of the 7-core is contained, for instance, in Rajan (1989). The author shows
that in a symmetric Cournot oligopolywith linear demand and quadratic costs, for a number
of firms n > 3, firms never chose to stay separate (i.e., giving rise to the coalition structure
{1; 2; ...;n}); moreover, it is proved that, for n <4, the 7-core is non empty.
In what follows, after a short description of the Cournot setting, we first show that, in
a symmetric oligopoly with linear demand and linear costs, the 7-core strictly includes the
equal split allocation for any number of firms. For the same model specification we then
prove that the equal split allocation is the unique allocation contained in the ^core. Finally,
we show that, when costs are quadratic, the (fhcore can be empty.
3.1 The Cournot setting
Let TTi (y,yi) = p{y)yi Ci (yi) be the profit function of every firm i € iV = {1,2,...,n},
where yi is the output of a firm, 3/ = E the total output, p{y) the usual inverse demand
t=l
function and Q {yi) the cost function ofevery firm. Let also Q (.) = Cj (.), for every i, j in
We introduce the following standard assumptions:
A.l The function TTj (.) is twice continuously difFerentiable;
A.2 For every firm i, thecapacity constraint < 00 determines themaximum production
level;
A.3 p"{.)yi -l-p'(.) < 0 andp'(.) - Cj' < 0.
Consistently with Section 2, we now define the normal form game, denoted as Fi, associ
ated to our problem. Each player (firm) strategy set is:
Xi-{yieR+-.yi< 3/J = Yi. m
Players' preferences are linear in profit and, for every coalition S, the strategy set is repre
sented by:
= \ {ys.is) •• ys e JJy; and ts - {tu -,ts) such that =0^ (8)
I S • i^s }
where ts is a vector of transfers.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the game Ti.
Proof. By A.l, every player's payoff functions is continuous in the strategy profile yi^ and,
by A.3, strictly concave on yi. By A.2, strategy sets are non empty, compact and convex, so
that existence of a Nash equilibrium follows. Uniqueness is implied by A.3 as follows. Since,
for each firm, p"yi -i-p' < 0 and p'— C" < 0, the function F = p'yi -\-p—C' is decreasing
both in yi and y. In fact, = p'— C" < 0 and = p"yi +?/ < 0 . Suppose now
that there exist twoNashEquilibria y^ and y"^ ofTi. Suppose also, without loss of generality,
that y^ > y^. At aNash Equilibrium, p'yi - C[ —0, so that, if ^y} > X] yj, it follows
t=i 1=1
from A.3 that y} < y^ for every i = 1,..,n, leading to a contradiction. •
3.2 The 7-core
By applying the definition of (5) to the Cournot setting introduced above, we obtain the
following expression:
^7 (*5) = P (ys,y-s) yi ~ Ci {yi) + u
te5
where
ys = arg ma^ ^ \p (ys, ys) yi - Q(yi) +U
and where U is the equilibrium lump-sum transfer for every 2 € 5, and
/ \
yj = arg max p yj^ys, yk
k^j
Vj - Ci (yj), Vj € N\S.
\
/
k^Sj
(9)
(10)
(11)
By A.l, we can differentiate Vy {S) and, by symmetry of players, the strategy profile
characterizing (5) is such that, for every i 6 5, yi respects:
p{y)-^p'iy)syi = Ci{yi), (12)
where s = \S\, while, for every j € N\S, yj respects:
p{y) + p' (y) yj = Cj iyj) • • (13)
3.3 The (p-core
We now apply our equiUbrium concept to theoligopolistic setting described above. According
to the general setup, the function V(f,{S) is as follows;
[p (ys, fe&)}jeAr\s) Vi - Ciiys) +«il (14)
te5
where
ys =aj:gmaxJ2 \p ivs, fe(ys)}ygm5) Vi - Gfei) +til (15)
ys^y^ i^s •'
and Vi € N\S,
Vjiys) =ar|maxp (j/s, {Vkiys)}k^^N\s)\{j}. %) Vj - Cj{yj). (16)
Note first that, as ii = 0, the function v^{S) is fully defined by the choice of a vector ^5
»e5
by the members of S.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique value (S) for every S CN.
Proof. We apply Proposition 1. ByProposition 2, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.for
every restricted game Ti (N\S,ys)- Continuity ofpayoffs follows from A.l and compactness
of every strategy set from A.2. Moreover, by A.3 payoffs are strictly concave, so that the
value (S) is unique. •
According to the above result, under A.l and symmetry, the FOCs characterizing t/at are,
for every i S S:
P(y) +P' {y) syi = C'i {yi) (17)
and, Vj 6 N\S,.
PW) +p' (y) yj Ws) = C'j ivj (ys)). (18)
3.4 The linear case
Having defined 7 and (fycoie for the Cournot setting, we now study the linear case, i.e. the
case in which p{y) = a —by, and, for every i € N, Ci (yi) = cyi, with a > c > 0 and 6 > 0.
Proposition 4 Under linearity and symmetry, the 7-core of the game Ti is non empty and
strictly includes the equal split allocation.
Proof. Conditions (12) implies that:
{N) =
and
6^ (n —s -H 2y
1
>
s(n-5 + 2)^ ' 4n
Straightforward calculations show that the above inequality is satisfied respectively for:
s > n
n —y/n^ + 8n
n + y/n^ + 8n
s > 2H >n
and hence, it is never satisfied for 1 < 5 < n. It follows that the equal split allocation for N,
characterized by the strategy vectors {yN,tN), where respects (12) and = (0,0,0),
belongs to the 7-core. To see that this allocation is strictly included in the 7-core, note that,
since individual deviations assign to a player just ({i}) = different
and unequal allocations belong as well to the 7-core. In particular, any allocation giving to
a player i his worth ^^"({1}), and to any remaining player, is hot
where 5 = |5| and n = \N\. Without loss of generality let us normalize = 1, so that the
equal spHt allocation gives to each player in iV a payoff of ^ and (5) = .
Consider now the equal split allocation for a coalition S, ^7lf^ = ——^ . WhateverWr 5(n—s+2)''
distribution of the worth Vy (S) may be chosen by S, at least one player in S must get a
payoff not greater than implies that coalition S improves upon the equal
split allocation for N if and only if
blocked. •
We now characterize the ^core of the game Fi under linearity and symmetry. The
next proposition shows that, once deviating coalitions are allowed to exploit a first mover
advantage, all allocations but the equal spUt one are blocked.
Proposition 5 In a linear symmetric oligopoly the equal-split allocation is the unique allo
cation belonging to the <{)-core. •
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 4, under normalization, we get:
(N) =\
and, from condition (17),
4(n-s + l)'
Hence, straightforward calculations show that, for every S C N, is less than for
I < s < n, and equal to either for s = n or 5 = 1. It follows that, since in £iny
deviating coalition 5 C iV at least one player gets a payoff less than or equal to , no
coalition S <Z N can make all its member better off than in the equal split allocation ,
which is then in the 0-core. To see that the equal-split is the unique allocation in the (jycove,
note that any other allocation would require to give to at least one player less than
However, such a player could always improve his payoff by deviating and, from the result
above, getting a worth equal to ({i}) = •
3.5 The linear-quadratic case
We now consider the case of linear demand function p{y) = a—y and quadratic cost function
Ci (j/i) = ^. As indicated above, we know from Rajan (1989) that, for n = 2, n = 3 and
71 = 4, the 7-core is non empty. We nowshow that this result does not hold under the ^core
assumption.
By conditions (17) and (18), the following result can be proved.
Proposition 6 Under linear demand and quadratic costs for every firm, the (p-core can be
empty.
Proof. >From first order conditions, it is obtained that:
{N) =
(l + 2nf
10
and „ „
.,(a^+ 5n - 1)
''^"'»=(n+l)(n +5)-
Simple calculations show that, for every i 6 iV, and for n>2,v^ ({i}) > By efficiency
of the equal split solution, in any other efficient allocation at least one player would receive
a lower utility. This fact together with the above result that any player can improve upon
the equal spUt allocation by deviating as singleton, imply that any efficient allocation can be
I
objected by the deviation of a single player. This, in turn, imphes that the ^core is empty. •
4 The core of a public good economy
In this section we study'the ^core of an economywith one private and one public good. We
mostly refer to the work on 7-core by Chander sindTulkens (1997) (C-T hereafter), and show
that their results carry over to the ^core if and only if preferences are linear in the public
good.®
4.1 The economy
We consider an economy with one public good q and one private good y. The set of agents
is = {1, ...,n}; each agent i is endowed with LOi units of the private good, and produces
the public good out of the private good with convex cost Ci(qi). For every S C N, we
denote by qg the vector {qi)iQS^ and by Q5 the term Qi'i for simplicity, we write q instead
i€-S
of gyv and Q instead of Qyy/. Preferences are represented by a quasilinear utility function
(Q) + 3/i- We denote by 7ri(Q) = the marginal rate of substitution
between public and private good for player i, and for all coalitions 5 C iV, we let 7r5(Q)
denote the term ^ T^iiQ)-
i€S
We make the following assumptions.
A.4: Vi (Q) concave, twice differentiable andsuch that -KiiQ) > 0for allqsuch that C^iqi) <
i^N
E ^i-
i€N
A.5: Ci{qi) strictly concave, twice differentiable and such that G-(gi) > 0 for all qi > 0
and Ciiqi) = 0 for qi = 0.
®Although C-T's results are obtained for an economy with pollution, they generalize to public goods
economies under the assumptions made in this paper.
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We associate to this economythe normal form game denoted r2, where strategy sets and
preferences are as follows:
= |(g5,2/5) e ta) ^ '
I t€5 tS5 i€S }
Ui{x) = Vi{Q)-\-yi. -
Proposition 7 (Chander-Tulkens): There exists a unique Hash Equilibrium of the game
r2.
The Nash Equilibrium {q,y) = (51,-.-,971,^1,-j^n) ofr2 is characterized by the following
FOC's:
TTi (Q) = C; (gi), yieN. (19)
4.2 The 7-core
Chander an Tulkens show by construction that the 7-core of the game r2 is non-empty. We
report their result in the following Proposition.
Proposition 8 (Chander-Talkens): The joint strategy {q*,y*) where:
g" is such that (Q*) = C- (q*), for all iGN;
y' =Wi~Ci{gi)-
TTiV (Q/*)
is in the 'y-core.
Y: (C.- (gn - Ci (?.))
li&N
In what follows we will refer to as the C-T allocation.
4.3 The (^core
In this section we analj^ze the symmetric case (identical players) and we show that under
linear preferences, Proposition 8 carries over to the case of (^core. However, we also show
that, if preferences are strictly concave, the (fhcoie may be empty.
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4.3.1 The function
By definition, any partial equilibrium [(^5,^5), (95,^5)) of r2 with respect to S is such
that
qs 6 argm^^Ui Qs+ ^
\ 3^N\S j i€S
s.t. Y^coi > ^lCi{qi)^yi] •
i€S ieS
and, Vj € N\S
f \
qj{qs) = aigm^Vj Qs-\- 9jfe)+gj
' \ k^N\S)\{j} j
s.t. ojj > Cj(gj)+yj
+ 2/i
Proposition 9 For every S Q N, there exists a partial equilibrium ofT2 with respect to S.
Moreover, all partial equilibria with respect to S are characterized by the same vector q. •
Proof. By Proposition 7, the Nash equilibrium of T2{N\S, qs) exists and is unique for all
S and qs. By continuity of Vi, (A.4), and of Ci{qi), (A.5), Proposition 1 can be applied
here. Moreover, as the maximization problem of S can be written as a function of just qs,
by concavity of Vi and strict convexity of Ci (qi), Proposition 1 can again be applied to show
uniqueness. •
4.3.2 Some characterization of the partial equilibria of Fg
We now analyze in greater detail the partial equilibria of r2.
We first consider the first order condition for every player j GN\S: by symmetry, we
can write
TTj {qj + (n - s - l)qj + Qs) - C (qj) = 0. (20)
ByAssumptions 1and2,and applying theimplicit function theorem to themapping f (g^-, qs) =
TTj ((n - s)qj + Qs) —C {qj), we conclude that the function qj (qs) is differentiable. Thus,
totally differentiating the FOC above, we obtain, in equilibrium, the condition
diTj
dq
yielding the reaction function
1 + (n - s)
dQs\
^ < 0
dQs C" (9,) - (n - s) ^
13
The term gives us the reaction of player j to changes in the vector qs as determined by
the changes in fs Nash equilibrium strategy in the gjime r2 {N\Sj q$).
Given the reaction function of each outside player j, the maximization problem of coalition
S yields the following FOCs:
TS (q) (^1 +(n - S) =c" (ft), Vi eS. (21)
By plugging the expression for into (21), we obtain ;
71-5 (^5 + (n - s). qj(qs)) {I - k) = C[ (q{} (22)
where
/ dTTj \
0<(l-fc)= (71-S) ^ + 1 < 1- (23)
Indeed, the presence of the term (1 —k) is the only difference between our optimality con
ditions and the ones obtained by C-T. Comparing the conditions characterizing and
it can be easily checked that the aggregate amount of public good induced by the deviation
of a coalition S under the 7-assumption is greater than or equal to that induced under the
(^assumption.
In order to prepare the analysis of the next section, we establish here some properties of
partial equilibria. We will refer to the original concept ofpartial equilibrium introduced by
C-T as to the partial equilibria under the 7-assumption.
Lemma 10 The aggregate amount of public good produced in the partial equilibrium with
respect to S is not greater under the <f>-assumption than under the j-assumption.
Proof. Let (S) and Q"' (S) be the aggregate levels ofpublic goods in the partial equilib
rium w.r.t. S under the (p and 7-assumption, respectively. Suppose that (5) > Qt (5);
then, by FOC (20), for each player j GN\S, qf (5) < q] (S). Moreover, as (1 - fc) < 1,
from FOC (22) for every player i £ S, qf (S) < qJ (S). The two inequalities imply a
contradiction. •
Lemma (10) and Proposition 5 in Chander-Tulkens (1997) imply that the aggregate
amount of public good produced in the partial equilibrium w.r.t. S under the ^ assump
tion is not greater than the efficient one.
Lemma 11 If preferences are linear in the public good, then:
^)qf{S)<qt,VieN;
iV Qi < qf (S), Vi GN;
Hi) qj = qf (S), Vj €N\S.
14
Proof, i): By definition of the term (1—k) in condition (23), if preferences are linear then
(1—A:) = 1. By condition (22) this imphes the following implications for alH G5:
• C',{qtiS))=ns<-^N =CHqt).
Similarly, for all j GN\S, condition (20) impHes:
Cj {gf (S)) =TT,. <nr, =C'j (g-.) .
The two implications, together with strict convexity of Ci{.) for every i € N, imply the result.
ii) and Hi): By conditions (22) and (19), for all i e S:
q m =-K,<-ns =C[ [qf (5)) .
By conditions (20) and (19), for all j GN\S:
C'i %) =VT; =c] {q1 (S)) .
Again by convexity of cost functions, the results follow. •
4.3.3 The robustness of Chander-Tulkens result under linear preferences
We are now able to show that under linear preferences for the pubhc good. Proposition 8 by
C-T generalizes to the ^core.
Proposition 12 If preferences are linear, then the C-T allocation (?*,2/*) belongs to the
(p-core.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 2 in Chander-Tulkens (1997) can be directly apphed using
Lemma (11). Indeed, Lemma (11) establishes all the properties that are needed in the proof
of that proposition. •
4.3.4 The ^instability of Chander-Tulkens allocation under non-line£u: prefer
ences
Under non linear preferences, C-T's result requires an additional assumption (Assumption 1"
in their paper) concerning themarginal rate ofsubstitutioncharacterizing respectively a Nash
and an efficient allocation. Under this assumption, and using a few properties both of Nash
and partial equilibrium allocations under the 7-assumption, the authors prove Proposition
8 also for the non linear case. Using the notation introduced in the previous sections, such
15
properties axe that qj (5) > qi, for all i 6 5, and that {S) < qj^ for all j € N\S.
It is easy to check that the first property does not longer hold under the ^assumption:
indeed, in C-T's paper this property is proved through the following chain of implications:
C'i (g? (5)) = TTS (Q^ (5)) > TTS {Q') > tt,- (Q) = Ci{%),
where the inequality tts (Q*) > itj (Q) is indeed Assumption 1".
Under ^assumption, the above chain of implications would write
C'i [qf {S)) =-KS {Q* (5)) (1 - fc) >TTS m >TT,- (0) =C[ [qi]
which, as (1 —A;) < 1 by non-linearity of preferences, may well not be true. Actually, as
Example 1 below shows, linearity turns out to be a necessary condition for C-T result to
carry over under (^assumption. Indeed, as it is proved in Proposition (13), in Example 1 the
4>-coie is empty.
Example 1. Let preference be described by the utility function
Ui (g,Xi) = +yi
and let costs be described by the function
It can be easily checked that Assumption 1" in Chander-Tulkens (1997) is satisfied if a >
We consider the deviation of a single player i, producing a zero amount of public good. By
showing that, given the reactions of the other players, this strategy represents for him. an
improvement upon the allocation proposed by C-T, we show that he can improve upon it
under the ^-assumption, as zero production is always a feasible strategy for him. The reaction
of the other (n —1) players to the "no production" strategy of i is obtained by the FOC
1 - 2aqj (n - 1) = qj
yielding
1
(n-1)
and
Q =
^ l + 2a(n-l)*
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By using Samuelson's efficiency condition
n(l —2aQ*) = Q*
n
TV
we obtain the efficient level of public good
Q* =
1 + 2n^a
We are then able to compare the utility (u*) received by i in the C-T allocation with the
utility that i receives through a (zero production) deviation:
U4 =
ul =
n"
1 + 27i2a
n — 1
1 + 2q (n - 1)
— a
1 + 2n2a
1 / n \2
2 \l-\-2n'^aJ
n-l ••2
— a
.1 -\-2a{n- 1).
By straightforward calculations, it turns out that, for n > 2 and a > 0.5, (u? - u') is
always positive; hence, every player canindividually improve upon the C-T allocation, which,
therefore, is not in the ^core. We report in the table below a few numerical values for
(uP-u?).
. 71 = 2, a = 0.5 (u? - = 0.224
n = 10, Q= 0.5 (uj—u*) = 0.8
n = 50, a = 0.5 (lij —u*) = 0.96
n = 100, a = 0.5 (u? - u^) = 0.98
Proposition 13 Let costs andpreference he as in Example 1. Then the (j>-core of the asso
ciated cooperative game is empty.
Proof. It is shown in Example 1 that any player could improve upon C-T's solution by
exploiting a first mover advantage. By efficiency of that solution, for any other efficient
solution (g,7/), at least one player i would receive a lower utility than in But as any
player can unprove upon (5*,^*) by deviating as singleton, than player i can improve upon
(g, y) in the same way. •
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has presented anew solution concept for cooperative games. Our concept modifies
the 7-core by introducing a temporal structure in the choices of strategies in the underlying
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normal form game which is similar to the one adopted in the a-core. At the same time,, it
is maintained the 7-assiimption that outside players react to a forming coalition by splitting
up into singletons. This approach is meant to account for those cases in which coalitions can
break an agreement and, in so doing, force the outside players to react to their new strategy.
In this paper we have focused our attention on two applications: Cournot oligopolies and
public good provision. Our results on cartel formation show that, in a linear symmetric
oligopoly, considering the (fhcoierestricts the set of core outcomes to the equal split allocation.
I
Moreover, differently from the 7-core, under quadratic costs the 0-core may be empty. In the
second application, Chander and Tiilkens (1997) results are shown to be robust against the
temporal structure assumed in the (jycoie if and only if preferences are hnear in the public
good. In the case of non linear preferences, conversely, whenever a coalition can exploit a
first mover advantage, the 7-assumption on coalition formation is no longer sufficient to yield
a non-empty core.
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